CCDA评论 | 唐世平：乌克兰——作为一个解决方案

作者按

本文是一篇16年前写的短文（原文为英文），此前从未发布中文版本。文章写于2009年1月（格鲁吉亚危机后不久），其基本动因源于我对欧洲局势的深切忧虑。

文章完成后，我曾向多家西方媒体投稿，包括此前发表过我文章的报纸，甚至包括当时的《莫斯科时报》（Moscow Times），但无一愿意刊发（我猜，一方面是我不够有名，另外一方面可能他们都觉得我是在危言耸听）。我有点绝望，最后询问了杰维斯先生是否愿意和我一起署名，他拒绝了。因此，这篇文章就一直存放在我的电脑里。

后来，2014年第一次乌克兰危机爆发，我请一位日本友人在一个网页上发布了这篇文章。那时西方舆论已经完全陷入了对俄罗斯的谴责，无人深究危机的根源。最终，各方“梦游（sleepwalking）”般地跨入了2022年的俄乌冲突。

从2009年到2014年，直至2022年爆发的俄乌冲突，实为一场大悲剧。如果一定要分配责任的话，欧洲的领导人（主要是德国和法国，还有英国、波兰、欧盟等）要负主要责任，其次是美国和乌克兰。他们认为，即便是不断地羞辱俄罗斯，俄罗斯也不会有太多的反抗（这方面的历史证据非常多，就无需赘述了）。

最后，我有以下几点声明：

1. 我对乌克兰人民抱有深度的同情。事实上，苏联解体后，中国和乌克兰一直保持良好的关系（自2011年起两国即确立“战略伙伴关系”）。另外，我从2001年开始就始终认为，健康稳定的中俄关系对于中国的陆地安全是极其关键的（可参阅我的公开论文及评论）。

2. 作为一个中国学者，我既不亲美，也不亲俄，我只亲中。

3. 作为一个研究战争与和平问题的学者，我们的研究目标是为了和平，因为和平永远是值得珍惜和维护的。人类历史的长河已经浸染太多血腥了。

4. 《孙子兵法》的警句依然振聋发聩：“兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。”“主不可以怒而兴师，将不可以愠而致战。”

以下为原文的译文及原文。

                  乌克兰：作为一个解决方案

                       唐世平

                      2009年1月8日

柏林墙倒塌已十九年，而在俄罗斯与格鲁吉亚冲突之后，一个全新的“二十年危机”正在欧洲悄然酝酿。

经历了层出不穷的口诛笔伐后，事实表明，无论是欧盟、北约还是俄罗斯，许多决策者依旧被传统地缘政治思维所左右，被种族优越感、恐惧、贪婪甚至敌意所蒙蔽。双方不断地互相谴责与指控，一步步将彼此推入更深的安全困境。最终，他们将自己拖入一个日益可能出现的“冷和平”状态，甚至可能演变成新的冷战。但是几乎没有人知道如何避免这种局面。事实上，双方不少人都并不急于阻止危机的发生，他们更希望借由互相惩罚来解决问题。一场真正的悲剧正在悄然酝酿。

随着局势的发展，乌克兰逐渐被视为博弈的新战场。一方面，虽然大部分欧洲国家对此避而不谈，但美国的一众人士，从布什、切尼再到奥巴马都一再宣称，乌克兰终将加入北约；另一方面，俄罗斯明确表示，绝不容忍乌克兰加入北约。

然而，乌克兰也为防止欧洲危机爆发提供了绝佳契机。解决之道在于，让乌克兰走中立路线，即加入欧盟，但不加入北约。一个由欧盟和俄罗斯共同支持的中立的乌克兰，既符合“老欧洲”和“新欧洲”的利益，也符合俄罗斯的根本利益。这一安排不仅传递出双方拒绝再度陷入冷战、摒弃永远对立的信号，还能缓解双方日益加深的安全困境，为更加建设性的关系留出余地。

如今，欧洲的主要国家，尤其是法国和德国，都不得不承认，冷战结束后那种“欧盟和北约始终一体”的旧日幻想已经一去不返。在后冷战时代，欧盟与美国的利益往往各有不同，有时甚至大相径庭，德国和法国也不能还在假装和美国的分歧总能弥合。

在这样的背景下，实现欧洲核心利益更应该依托于扩张欧盟。欧盟致力于建立一个以国际法和共同规则为基础，而不仅仅依赖军事力量的安全共同体；而北约作为一个始终以美国为中心、永远需要敌人的军事联盟，其扩张只有在特定情况下才能符合欧洲的长远利益。

冷战结束后，美国的首要战略目标一直是防止出现一个能够与之匹敌的竞争对手，这一点在1992年泄露的五角大楼《国防规划指导》中已有明确表述。无论意识形态分歧如何，老布什、克林顿和小布什都在力图实现这一目标。谁又能谴责他们？作为美国总统，他们必须坚信保持美国霸权不仅对美国有利，也符合全球利益，并践行着这一理念。

基于这种霸权逻辑，美国视团结的欧洲，就如中国、印度、俄罗斯一样，为潜在竞争对手。因此，不少美国决策者对欧元颇为担忧，害怕它会挑战美元在全球金融体系中独有的储备货币地位，从而削弱美国的全球影响力。

对于美国来说，阻止欧盟成为真正的竞争者，最简单的办法就是“分而治之”。只要欧洲各国继续分裂，美国就少了一个强有力的对手。

因此，美国不遗余力地在欧洲内部制造分歧。美国前国防部部长拉姆斯菲尔德曾公开表示，“旧欧洲”已成过去，而“新欧洲”代表未来，这正是这种战略逻辑的真实写照。通过在一些“新欧洲”国家部署军事基地，美国确保了部分欧洲国家更依赖美国而不是欧盟，从而使欧洲自然而然地分裂为两个阵营。这样的策略不仅有助于制衡俄罗斯，也进一步分化了欧洲。

为了避免和俄罗斯永久敌对，欧盟（尤其是法国和德国）必须遏制美国和北约在欧洲事务中的主导作用。法国和德国需要明确表示，在欧洲事务上，尽管仍会听取美国的意见，但他们将主导决策。从根本上讲，欧洲各国无论属于新旧哪一阵营，在抉择时都应优先欧盟，而非依赖北约。

然而，时至今日，德国和法国一直不愿迫使其他欧洲国家做出明确选择，因为他们自己也不想面对这种艰难的抉择。他们任由北约不断向俄罗斯逼近，也乐意成为美国遏制羞辱俄罗斯的共谋者。他们寄希望于俄罗斯能委曲求全，咽下苦果。

或许像俄罗斯一样，法国和德国仍停留在传统地缘政治的思维模式中。他们大谈欧盟应成为“规范性权力”，因此暗中支持北约向俄罗斯推进。对于法国和德国的许多人来说，遏制俄罗斯无疑是最简单可靠的应对之策。正因这种恐俄政策，欧盟与俄罗斯之间的恐惧与猜疑不断加剧。而俄罗斯对格鲁吉亚的强硬行动，则表明其不会再容忍现状。

一个中立的乌克兰能够打破这种以美国和北约来制约俄罗斯的模式，但这并不意味着俄罗斯能够高枕无忧。中立的乌克兰同样要求俄罗斯承诺维护乌克兰的领土完整和中立地位。如果俄罗斯接受这一安排，也就无法再构建新帝国：不把乌克兰纳入版图，也不可能构筑一个新的俄罗斯帝国。

或许有人会将中立乌克兰的方案视为对俄罗斯的绥靖政策，但这种说法并不准确。尽管普京言辞强硬，但他不是希特勒。将普京与希特勒相提并论不仅是不恰当的比较，而且只会加剧国内的仇恨和恐惧情绪。

普京是一位典型的现实主义者，其政治思维深植于传统地缘政治观念中。他渴望建立一个包括美国和欧洲在内，世界都敬畏的强大的俄罗斯，但并无意将俄罗斯变成第三帝国。目前也没有任何可靠迹象显示，俄罗斯正试图通过武力或恐吓手段将其昔日的殖民地重塑为新帝国。

尽管俄罗斯在言辞上强硬，但与布什和切尼时期的美国相比，行动并没有那么激进。俄罗斯既没有退出反导条约，也没有撕毁《京都议定书》，更不曾入侵伊拉克。只是希望恢复昔日的威望，以及其“势力范围”获得应有的尊重。在欧洲和美国指责俄罗斯谈论势力范围之前，他们不妨反思：难道他们不曾试图通过北约扩张，将势力范围延伸到俄罗斯门前吗？

部分乌克兰精英可能认为，选择中立，就意味着乌克兰为了安抚俄罗斯而放弃了同时加入欧盟和北约的机会。毕竟回溯俄罗斯帝国和苏联时期的种种苦难，对俄罗斯的恐惧和仇恨在前苏联及东欧国家中根深蒂固。乌克兰也不例外，自然希望能彻底逃离俄罗斯的威胁。

遗憾的是，从长远来看，加入北约并非乌克兰的最佳选择。现实是，如果北约试图将乌克兰纳入其阵营，而乌克兰内部又有部分恐俄势力试图借此摆脱地缘困境，那么乌克兰的俄罗斯族群很可能会寻求分裂。一旦局面失控，内战沿着族群地域将乌克兰分割也并非没有可能。而在这种推搡之中，正如美国和北约曾在格鲁吉亚所做的那样，如果俄罗斯以保护其族群为借口干预内战从而分裂乌克兰，理智的美国或欧盟领导人都不会冒着风险与拥有核武器的俄罗斯开战。

因此，想要保持中立并得到欧盟与俄罗斯共同支持，乌克兰需要承诺与俄罗斯和平共处。没有哪个国家能够超越地缘限制，乌克兰亦不例外。尽管对西方怀有情感依恋，但乌克兰必须学会如何与俄罗斯和平相处。把俄罗斯永远定性为敌人，通过加入北约来解决问题，只会让情感凌驾于理性之上，带来灾难性的后果。

或许乌克兰应当借鉴越南与中国相处的经验。越南与中国曾长期对抗，也曾与法国和美国发生冲突，且在1975至1989年间与苏联结盟对抗中国。最终却不得不承认：无论外部盟友多么强大，都负担不起得罪中国的代价。因此，过去二十年间，越南一直在努力寻找一种介于中国与其他外部势力（例如美国）之间的“中间道路”，而非简单地宣布中立。越南领导人深知，外交的艺术在于在地缘限制下找到切实可行的方案，而非一味追求情感上的满足。

同理，格鲁吉亚或许也应有类似的选择，加入欧盟，但不加入北约。这样一来，格鲁吉亚人就能意识到，他们的福祉与欧盟绑定得更紧密，而非与美国或北约。一个中立的格鲁吉亚也需要与俄罗斯和平相处，哪怕这并非易事。

如果欧盟无法制止以美国为中心的北约不断逼近俄罗斯，那么俄罗斯只会变得更加恐惧与愤怒；而如果俄罗斯拒绝接受一个中立的乌克兰，欧盟可能不得不准备新一轮的对俄制裁。使乌克兰中立不仅考验双方能否以可信的承诺实现相互包容，更是朝着构建更加平和的俄罗斯和欧盟关系迈出关键一步。如果美国主导的北约也能支持一个中立的乌克兰，就能向外界展示美国对俄罗斯的善意，这无疑是最理想的局面。

如果欧盟与俄罗斯无法妥善处理乌克兰问题，那么整个欧洲，包括俄罗斯在内，都将为此付出沉重代价。最终的局面可能是一种冷和平，甚至是一种不那么意识形态化，但依然紧张的新冷战。到那时，美国、中国和印度的地缘政治家们可能会大肆嘲笑那些自诩开明的欧洲人愚蠢的决策。在经历了人类历史上最为血腥的两次战争，仅仅在冷战结束二十年后，欧洲人便又重回相互仇恨、甚至流血冲突的老路。无论是旧欧洲还是新欧洲，其实质都是一群始终无法和平共处的老对手。

然而，如果欧洲与俄罗斯能够齐心协力，或许欧盟将会为俄罗斯提供一个俄罗斯人渴望的归宿。愿上帝保佑欧洲。

                  Ukraine as a Solution

                    Shiping Tang

Nineteen years after the fall the Berlin War, a new Twenty Years Crisis is looming over Europe, in the wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict.

After all the indignation spitted and all the ink spilled, it becomes apparent that most elites in both EU/NATO and Russia are still thinking in traditional geopolitical logic, blinded by ethnocentrism, fear, greed, and perhaps even animosity. With each of their self-righteous condemnations and accusations against each other, the two sides are exacerbating a security dilemma, one notch at a time. As a result, they are dragging themselves into an ever more likely cold peace--if not a cold war--and have few clues how to forestall it. Indeed, many on both sides do not want to forestall it: what they want is to punish each other and fight it out. A real tragedy is in the making.

As the drama unfolds, many have come to see Ukraine as the next battle ground for the two sides’ resolve. On the one side, while major European countries remain muted on the subject, major U.S. politicians, from Bush, Cheney to Obama have all repeatedly asserted that Ukraine will be in NATO one day. On the other side, Russia has made it clear that it would not accept a Ukraine inside NATO.

Yet, Ukraine can also present a golden opportunity for preventing a new Twenty Years Crisis in Europe. The solution is a Ukraine with membership in the European Union (EU) but without membership in NATO--essentially a neutral Ukraine. A neutral Ukraine that is backed by EU and Russia is in the best interest of Europe—Old and New--and Russia. A neutral Ukraine backed by EU and Russia is a powerful signal that the two sides refuse to engage in another cold war and treat the other side as eternal foe. It freezes the spiraling security dilemma between them and preserves the possibility of forging a more constructive relationship between them.

By now, leading European states (read, France and Germany) must admit that the days when European leaders could pretend that EU and NATO are always together had ended when the Cold War ended. In post-Cold War Europe, the interest of EU and that of America often diverge--sometimes fundamentally, and France and Germany cannot continue to pretend that they and America can patch up all the time.

In post-Cold War Europe, Europe’s core interests are best served by the enlargement of EU, which seeks to produce a wide security community based on international law and norms rather than merely military might. The expansion of NATO, which has always been and will remain a U.S.-centric alliance in perpetual need of an enemy, serves Europe’s core interests only sometimes.

America’s primary strategic objective after the Cold War has always been to prevent the emergence of a peer competitor, explicitly advocated in the leaked Pentagon’s Defense Planning Guidance in 1992. For all their ideological differences, George Bush senior, Bill Clinton, and George Bush Jr. all have pursued this objective in earnest. And who can blame them--as America’s presidents, they must firmly believe that U.S. primacy is good for U.S. thus the world and act accordingly.

Under the strategy of preserving primacy, America regards a united Europe--just like China, India, and Russia, as a potential peer competitor. Only in light of this logic can we understand why so many U.S. policy elite were so worried about the Euro. The Euro can potentially unseat the dollar as the only reserve currency in the global financial system, thus weakening one of the pillars of America’s primacy.

For the United States, surely the easiest way to prevent EU from becoming a peer competitor is the time-tested golden rule of “divide-and-rule”. As long as Europe remains divided, America will have one less peer competitor to worry about. Not surprisingly, America has been busy in driving wedges among European states. Rumsfeld’s infamous calling the “Old Europe” as things of the past whereas the “New Europe” the future precisely reflects this strategic logic. By installing military bases in some of the “New Europe” states here and there, America has been making sure that there will always be some European states that value their ties to America more than their ties to the EU, thus dividing Europe into two camps effortlessly. Needless to say, such a strategy also achieves the ends of containing and humiliating Russia, thus further, if not permanently, dividing Europe.

EU-or more precisely, France and Germany, must put a stop to this U.S./NATO way of approaching European affairs, if they want to avoid making Russia their permanent enemy. Berlin and Paris have to speak loud and clear: when it comes to European affairs, they will take charge, although Washington will be consulted. Fundamentally, Berlin and Paris must demand that when it comes to making a choice, European states—“Old” or “New”--will have to choose EU over NATO.

So far, however, Berlin and Paris have been reluctant to force other European states to choose, because they themselves do not want to make a hard choice. By allowing NATO to push further and further toward Russia and doing nothing to stop the process, Berlin and Paris have been willing accomplices to Washington’s drive to contain and humiliate Russia. Paris and Berlin have been hoping that Russia will simply swallow all its pride and all the bitter pills. Perhaps France and Germany, just like Russia, are still thinking in traditional geopolitical logic for all their talk of EU being a “normative power”, thus secretly applauding NATO’s march toward Russia’s doorsteps. For many in Berlin and Paris, the surest way to deal with Russia is simply to contain it. Due to this Russia-phobic policy, it is not surprising that fear and suspicion between EU and Russia has increased substantially. Russia’s forceful partition of Georgia signals that Russia is not going to take it any more.

A neutral Ukraine puts a stop to this U.S./NATO-centric approach of containing and humiliating Russia. Yet, Russia does not get a free-ride. A neutral Ukraine also demands Russia to signal its benign intentions by committing itself to uphold the territory integrity and neutrality of Ukraine. If Russia does agree to such an arrangement, Russia will be effectively binding itself against reconfiguring a new empire: a new Russian empire is impossible without first incorporating Ukraine.

Many may accuse the solution of a neutral Ukraine as appeasement. This will be cheap shot. Valdmir Putin is not Hitler, for all his tough talks. Hitler was one-of-a-kind and to paint Putin a Hitler is to distort the picture: doing so only serves to drive up the hatred and fear for domestic consumptions. Putin is a typical Russian realist, grounded thoroughly in traditional geopolitical thinking. He wants a Great Russia that is respected by others, including the United States and Europe; but he has no ambition to turn Russia into a Third Reich. Moreover, there have been no credible signs that Russia wants to reconfigure its former colonies into a new empire by force and intimidation. Russia, for all its tough talks and faults, has not done the kind of things that Bush and Cheney have done. Russia did not tear down the ABM treaty, scrap the Kyoto Protocol, and invade Iraq. Russia merely wants some prestige restored, and yes, some respect for their “sphere of influence”. And before European states (and U.S.) denounce Russia’s talk of sphere of influence, they better ask themselves: haven’t they been trying to expand their sphere of influence up to Russia’s doorsteps with NATO’s expansion?

Some elite in Ukraine may charge the solution of a neutral Ukraine is to sacrifice their hope of dual EU and NATO membership, for the sake of appeasing Russia. With all the unpleasant experiences first in Russian empire and then USSR, fear and hatred against Russia run deep in many former republics of USSR and East European states. Ukraine is no exception; it thus wants to be totally safe from Russia.

Unfortunately, joining NATO is not even in Ukraine’s long-term interest. The hard reality is that if NATO wants to pull Ukraine into their alliance and Ukraine’s Russo-phobic elite want to escape from geography by allying with NATO, the Russian population in Ukraine may want secession. Once it happens, a civil war and then a partition of Ukraine along the ethnic-geographical divide is not an impossibility. And when it comes to push-and-shove, NATO and U.S. may still stand by just as they have done in Georgia: no sane U.S. and EU leaders will risk a war with a nuclear Russia if Russia decides that it wants to partition Ukraine under the pretext of intervening in a civil war that kills ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

A neutral Ukraine backed by EU and Russia thus also demands Ukraine to commit herself to live peacefully with Russia. No country can escape from geography, and Ukraine is no exception. Despite its emotional attachment to the West, Ukraine thus must learn how to live peacefully with Russia. Making Russia Ukraine’s permanent enemy by joining NATO is to allow emotion trumps rational calculation.

Perhaps Ukraine will be wise to learn something lessons from Vietnam’s experience in living with China. Having fought China for a millennium (and France and United States briefly) and allied with the Soviet Union against China from 1975-1989, Vietnam has grudgingly admitted that it can ill-afford to antagonize China regardless how powerful its external allies are. Hence, in the past twenty years or so, Vietnam has been trying to achieve a delicate “middle ground” between China and other external powers (i.e., the U.S.), without declaring neutrality. Vietnamese leaders understand that the art of diplomacy is not to search for the emotionally gratifying, but the rationally possible, within geographic constrains.

In a similar vein, perhaps Georgia too should be presented with such an option of having EU membership but not NATO membership. If that is the case, Georgians may also come to recognize that their welfare is more tightly linked with EU rather than U.S and NATO. A neutral Georgia will also commit Georgia to live with Russia peacefully, however grudgingly.

If EU cannot stop U.S.-centric NATO from pushing toward Russia, Russia can only become more fearful and angry. And if Russia cannot commit herself to a neutral Ukraine, then EU may have to prepare for a possible new containment of Russia. A neutral Ukraine provides a test for their willingness of accommodating each other via credible commitments. Of course, a neutral Ukraine backed by EU and Russia is only the first step toward a more tranquil Russia-EU relationship. If U.S.-led NATO can also back a neutral Ukraine, it will signal America’s benign intentions toward Russia too. That would be an ideal outcome.

If EU and Russia cannot get Ukraine right; it will be Europe--Russia included--that will suffer the consequences. The result is likely to be a cold peace, if not a new although less ideological cold war. By then, geo-politicians in U.S., China, and India will have a field day, laughing at the self-proclaimed enlightened Europeans at their stupidity. After two bloodiest wars in human history and only short twenty years after the Cold War, the Europeans are now back at the game of hating, and possibly killing, each other again. Europeans, old or new, are just the same old bunch that cannot manage to live together with each other peacefully.

If Europe and Russia can get their acts together, however, maybe EU can provide the ultimate home for Russia that Russians have always longed. God bless Europe.

复旦大学“复杂决策分析中心”简介

复旦大学“复杂决策分析中心”成立于2013年，是我国第一个基于“计算社会科学”，专门为国家战略决策提供技术支持的研究中心。中心立足社会科学研究方法和问题前沿，直面变化与复杂的世界，旨在建立起一套基于广泛而丰富的历史经验和科学方法的分析框架、模型和工作软件，将前沿的社会科学研究方法与实际的学术和政策研究结合起来；把战略行为和战略决策研究的经验一般化、模型化，做到可复制、可移植。通过改进或整合既有的技术平台，开发新的技术平台，成为国家战略决策的技术支持中心，为我国的战略分析和决策提供技术支持。

中心的成立得到了来自国家多个重要部门和机构的支持。从2016年起，完全抛开民意调查，而是基于计算机模拟仿真技术，中心的团队已经连续五次精准预测了美国和我国台湾地区的选举结果。中心还开发了多款针对其它复杂决策问题的计算模拟预测平台。

唐世平教授简介

复旦大学“复杂决策分析中心”主任唐世平教授，是复旦大学特聘教授、教育部“长江学者”特聘教授、国际研究协会（The International Studies Association, ISA）副主席。作为当代中国最具国际影响的社会科学家之一，他在多个领域均有广泛丰硕的成果。迄今为止，他已出版五部英文专著、三部中文专著、一部英文编著和三部中文编著。其中，Social Evolution of International Politics（《国际政治的社会演化》，牛津大学出版社，2013年）于2015年荣获 ISA “年度最佳著作奖”，是亚洲和中国首位获此殊荣的学者。他的第五部英文专著The Institutional Foundation of Economic Development（《经济发展的制度基础》）于2022年在普林斯顿大学出版社出版。他也是多个国际顶级和一流刊物的第一位来自中国的编委会成员。

唐世平教授是中国计算社会科学、特别是决策计算的拓荒者之一，他提出了基于“全数据计算”（total data computation）的“决策计算社会科学”理念。

关于生物通路的复杂计算问题，是唐世平教授的一个新的兴趣领域。